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Abstract. A well-established method of constructing hash functions is to base them on non-
compressing primitives, such as one-way functions or permutations. In this work we present Sr,
an rn-to-n-bit compression function (for r ≥ 1) making 2r − 1 calls to n-to-n-bit primitives
(random functions or permutations). Sr compresses its inputs at a rate (the amount of message
blocks per primitive call) up to almost 1/2, and it outperforms all existing schemes with respect
to rate and/or the size of underlying primitives. For instance, instantiated with the 1600-bit
permutation of NIST’s SHA-3 hash function standard it offers about 800-bit security at a rate of
almost 1/2, while SHA-3-512 itself achieves only 512-bit security at a rate of about 1/3. We prove
that Sr achieves asymptotically optimal collision security against semi-adaptive adversaries up
to almost 2n/2 queries and that it can be made preimage secure up to 2n queries using a simple
tweak.
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cient; Parallelizable.
1 Introduction
For decades, the leading approach in hash function design has been blockcipher-based: a
cipher E is employed in a certain mode to obtain a hash function that satisfies some security
guarantees. This approach has been analyzed in detail [13,14,20,23,24,26,28,34,37,38,47], and
is followed by numerous hash functions, including the well-known SHA-{0,1,2} and MD{4,5}.
The recent trend is, however, predominantly permutation-based. Notably, three out of the
five finalists in NIST’s SHA-3 competition [36], including the eventual winner Keccak [8],
are built on permutations, and also the recently started CAESAR authenticated encryption
competition [15] received a wide range of permutation-based submissions [1,2,5,10,11,17,22,
25, 35, 43, 44]. Permutations do not require a key schedule (and particularly, there is no need
to re-key, which could be quite expensive for some blockciphers) and are simpler to design
and analyze. Additionally, the study of constructions starting from small domain random
functions or permutations is highly relevant [19, 30]. Note that, furthermore, a small set of
permutations can be easily generated from one blockcipher by fixing a handful of keys.
Consider a compression function F : {0, 1}M+n → {0, 1}n making d calls to an s-bit
primitive f (a blockcipher, non-compressing function, or permutation). The efficiency of such
a construction is commonly expressed in terms of a rate: Mds , the number of message bits
divided by the (scaled) number of primitive calls. Intuitively, a larger rate corresponds to less
primitive calls per message compression and thus to a higher efficiency. The “scaling” is done
by the term s in the denominator, and a construction with a larger underlying primitive has
a larger value s and thus a lower rate.
Many blockcipher-based compression functions achieve a high rate. For instance, the classi-
cal 2n-to-n-bit Davies-Meyer compression function F (h,m) = E(m,h)⊕h has rate 1. Double-
length blockcipher-based compression function such as Tandem-DM [28] compress at a rate
1/2: they map 3n bits to 2n bits making 2 calls to an n-bit blockcipher.
For non-compressing primitives, which do not offer compression on their own, a high rate
appears harder to achieve. One approach of designing a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
with optimal n/2-bit collision security is using non-compressing primitives of size significantly
larger than n bits. This approach is for instance followed by the Sponge [9]: it iterates a
permutation on c + m bits, where c is the capacity and m equals the message block size.1
Sponge functions make one primitive call per message block, have a rate mc+m , and are proven
secure up to 2c/2 queries [6]. (We remark that Sponge functions allow for variable output sizes,
by making extra primitive calls in the squeezing phase and outputting m bits at a time. This
approach, however, requires extra primitive calls, which influences the rate.) The new SHA-3
hashing standard is a Sponge using a 1600-bit permutation, and above computations apply.
For example, SHA-3-256 offers 256-bit security by compressing at a rate of about 2/3 and
SHA-3-512 offers 512-bit security by compressing at a rate of about 1/3. Note that, intuitively,
one should be able to achieve about 800-bit security using a 1600-bit primitive.
Black et al. [12], however, showed that it is impossible to construct a secure n-bit hash or
compression function using one call to an n-bit non-compressing primitive. More generally, for
a function F : {0, 1}M+n → {0, 1}n making d calls to an s-bit primitive, collisions can be found
in at most 2(ds−M)/(d+1) queries, a bound commonly known as “Stam’s bound” and proven
in [41,46,48,49]. Stam’s bound implies that a 2n-to-n-bit function requires at least three n-bit
primitive calls to achieve optimal collision resistance, hence such a function has rate at most
1/3. The problem of designing such a function has been well-studied [29, 31, 42, 45], and we
highlight the Shrimpton-Stam compression function, which we will refer to as S2:
S2(x0, x1) = f0(x0)⊕ f2(f0(x0)⊕ f1(x1)) .
The design is proven asymptotically optimally collision secure if f0, f1, f2 are three indepen-
dent n-bit random functions, or if they are instantiated as fi(x) = pii(x) ⊕ x for distinct
permutations pii [31]. It is, however, known to be insecure if one takes f0 = f1 = f2 [31, 45].
This and other functions have a rate of 1/3 or worse, and improving it has turned out to be
a very difficult theoretical problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
We introduce the family of compression functions Sr : {0, 1}rn → {0, 1}n for r ≥ 1. For r = 8,
the function S8 is depicted in Fig. 1. The function makes 2r− 1 function calls to 2dlog2 re+ 1
distinct primitives. Our class of functions is a graphical generalization of the Shrimpton-Stam
compression function S2, but it offers a higher rate r−12r−1 , approaching 1/2 for increasing values
of r, and thus allowing for a more efficient throughput of data whilst achieving comparable
collision security. This rate is in fact optimal, witnessed by Stam’s bound which suggests that
at least 2r − 1 function calls need to be made. Additionally, Sr is well-parallelizable, and
generally benefits from the same advantages as tree-based hash functions.
1.2 Efficiency
Based on the SHA-3 permutation pi : {0, 1}1600 → {0, 1}1600, our function Sr achieves almost2
800-bit security with a rate approaching 1/2. This is in sharp contrast with SHA-3-512 which
only achieves 512-bit security by compressing at a rate of about 1/3. If we instantiate our
function Sr using smaller versions of the SHA-3 permutation, for instance on 400 or 200 bits,
we can still get a high security level of almost 200 or 100 bits, respectively, while hashing at a
rate that approaches 1/2. This is of particular interest for lightweight cryptography, because
Sr shows that approximately the same level of security can be achieved as comparable schemes,
but using much smaller underlying primitives.
1 The authors originally refer to m as the “rate,” but in our terminology “rate” has a different meaning.
2 Sr makes use of p := 2dlog2 re + 1 distinct primitives, so dlog2 pe bits of the input to pi are reserved for
domain separation.
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4 genSS8
u0 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7
v
f0,0 f0,1 f0,0 f0,1 f0,0 f0,1 f0,0 f0,1
f1,0 f1,1 f1,0 f1,1
f2,0 f2,1
f3,0
x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3 x0,4 x0,5 x0,6 x0,7
x1,0 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3
x2,0 x2,1
x3,0
y0,0 y0,1 y0,2 y0,3 y0,4 y0,5 y0,6 y0,7
y1,0 y1,1 y1,2 y1,3
y2,0 y2,1
y3,0
z1,0 z1,1 z1,2 z1,3
z2,0 z2,1
z3,0
Fig. 1: Compression function S8 : {0, 1}8n → {0, 1}n making 15 primitive calls. Here, fj,b (for
(j, b) ∈ ({0, 1, 2} × {0, 1}) ∪ {(3, 0)}) are one-way functions, but these can be instantiated as
fj,b(x) = pij,b(x)⊕ x at no collision security loss.
We present a generic comparison of Sr in a Merkle-Damg˚ard mode of operation (MD-Sr)
[16,33] or in a Merkle tree (MT-Sr) [32] with Sponge functions [9], Grøstl [21], and MD6 [39]
in Table 1. In this analysis (see App. A for the technical details) we aim for comparable 2n/2
collision security and adopt the design parameters accordingly. We also include a comparison
for a specific set of parameters. We observe that Sr achieves comparable rate and efficiency,
but using primitives that are a factor 2 to 4 smaller. However, the security analysis of Sr
requires more distinct primitives than the other functions, and the proof is performed in a
slightly different model (see Sect. 1.3).
1.3 Security
We prove that Sr, either based on random functions or random permutations, is collision
secure up to about 2n/2/n queries. In other words, Sr is asymptotically nearly optimally
collision secure. In Table 2, we compare the rates and collision security guarantees of various
instantiations of Sr, both for the general case and for n = 512. The proof is performed in
a model where the adversary makes its queries layer-wise, which means that all queries to
fj−1,0 and fj−1,1 must be made before all queries to fj,0 and fj,1, for j = 1, . . . , `. We also
present a proof of n/3-bit security in the fully adaptive model and justify why it cannot be
easily improved. This is in part as security proofs are known to become significantly harder
when based on non-compressing primitives [30]. We conjecture that Sr does achieve optimal
collision security. Additionally, for technical reasons we require distinctness of the 2dlog2 re+1
underlying primitives. This can be achieved by employing a single blockcipher for a fixed set
of distinct keys. In Sect. 7 we show that it is non-trivial to reduce the number of distinct
primitives in Sr.
Next, we prove that S2 based on random functions is preimage resistant up to 22n/3
queries (solving an open problem of Shrimpton and Stam [45]). This result does not apply to
the permutation-based setting: an attack on Sr proving tight 2n/2 security is derived for any
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Table 1: Simplified comparison of MD-Sr with the Sponge function and Grøstl (first), and
MT-Sr with MD6 (second). m denotes the message block size (its rate). See also App. A.
general bounds for r = 4 and n = m = 512
function rate
primitive # distinct collision
rate
primitive # distinct collision
size primitives security size primitives security
MD-Sr r−1
2r−1 n 2dlog2 re+ 1 2n/2/n 3/7 512 5 2247
Sponge [9] m
n+m
n+m 1 2n/2 1/2 1024 1 2256
Grøstl [21] 1/2 2n 2 2n/2 1/2 1024 2 2256
MT-Sr r−1
2r−1
M
M−1 n 2dlog2 re+ 1 2n/2/n 3/7 MM−1 512 5 2247
MD6 [39] 3/4 M
M−1 4n 1 2
n/2 3/4 M
M−1 2048 1 2
256
Table 2: Rates of Sr : {0, 1}rn → {0, 1}n for various values of r, with on the right a supporting
graph for n = 512.
function rate
# distinct collision
primitives security
S2 1/3 3 2n/2/n
S3 2/5 5 2n/2/n
S4 3/7 5 2n/2/n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
Sr r−1
2r−1 2dlog2 re+ 1 2n/2/n
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
r
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
rate
r ≥ 2. We also show that a simple tweak can make Sr optimally preimage secure. Formally,
if we consider a hash or compression function F followed by a sufficiently strong finalization
function G, the design is as collision secure as the weakest of both and as preimage secure
as G (see also Lem. 1). The efficiency (rate) of the design is dominated by the rate of F .
Concretely:
H(M) = f ◦MD-Sr(M) ,
where G := f is a random function, is collision resistant up to about 2n/2/n queries (the
bound of Sr), preimage resistant up to about 2n queries (the preimage security of f), and it
has a rate of more or less r−12r−1 . Hence, in this way, one combines the efficiency and collision
security of Sr with the preimage security of f . The same result holds if f(x) = pi(x) ⊕ x for
a permutation pi.3 We remark that this trick does not apply to second preimage resistance.
1.4 Outline
We present our family of functions Sr based on functions fj,b in Sect. 2. Next, we give a
security analysis of Sr: the model is introduced in Sect. 3, collision resistance is analyzed in
Sect. 4, and preimage resistance in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we discuss the effect of instantiating
the underlying primitives fj,b using permutations pij,b. The work is concluded in Sect. 7.
3 These findings seem to violate the preimage bound of Rogaway and Steinberger [41], but note that their
bound does not apply : the construction H has a high preimage degeneracy.
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Sr for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0
1: procedure Sr(u0, . . . , ur−1)
2: for i = 0, . . . , 2` − 1 do
3: x0,i ← ui
4: y0,i ← f0,i mod 2(x0,i)
5: z0,i ← 0
6: for j = 1, . . . , ` and i = 0, . . . , 2`−j − 1 do
7: xj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i+1
8: yj,i ← fj,i mod 2(xj,i)
9: zj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i
10: return v ← (y ⊕ z)`,0
3 genSS4
u0 u1 u2 u3
v
f0,0 f0,1 f0,0 f0,1
f1,0 f1,1
f2,0
x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3
x1,0 x1,1
x2,0
y0,0 y0,1 y0,2 y0,3
y1,0 y1,1
y2,0
z1,0 z1,1
z2,0
Fig. 2: Sr for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0 and an illustration of S4. Here, we write (y⊕ z)j,i = yj,i⊕ zj,i.
2 Hash Function Proposal Sr
Throughout, r and ` always denote integral parameters. We consider n ∈ N and put N = 2n.
For simplicity, we first introduce Sr for r being a power of two. Next, we generalize it to
arbitrary r ≥ 1.
2.1 Sr for r = 2`
Write r = 2` with ` ≥ 0, and let fj,b : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be one-way functions for (j, b) ∈
({0, . . . , ` − 1} × {0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}. A description of Sr : {0, 1}rn → {0, 1}n is given in Fig. 2
together with an illustration of S4. Sr makes in total 2r − 1 primitive calls, which is optimal
with respect to Stam’s bound. These calls are made to in total 2`+ 1 distinct primitives.
The description of Sr can informally be described by the following two steps. First, the
inputs u0, . . . , ur−1 are “processed” using functions f0,0, f0,1. Second, for j = 1, . . . , ` and
i = 0, . . . , 2`−j − 1, at position (j, i) the function Sr proceeds as follows: given the outcomes
of the rounds at positions (j− 1, 2i) and (j− 1, 2i+ 1), the primitive fj,i mod 2 is evaluated on
input of the XOR of these, and its output is XORed with the outcome of round (j − 1, 2i).
Eventually, the output of Sr is the value obtained after the last step (for j = `). The feed-
forwards in the evaluation are necessary: absence of them would allow an adversary to find a
collision in, say, x1,0 — typically found in about 2
n/4 queries — in order to obtain a collision for
Sr. They also prevent trivial attacks where, e.g., the left and right input halves are swapped.
2.2 Sr for Arbitrary r
The description of Sr for arbitrary r ≥ 1 is given in Fig. 3 together with an illustration of S3.
The generalized Sr, indeed, also makes 2r− 1 primitive calls (to in total 2dlog2 re+ 1 distinct
primitives). Although this description is significantly more complex than the one of Fig. 2,
the intuition is rather simple and we give it for r = 3.
To define S3, we first consider S4 (see the illustration of Fig. 2). Now, S3 only has inputs
(u0, u1, u2) and no u3, and therefore the “fork” that processes inputs u2 and u3 in S
4 only
gets u2. We can then simply discard the two corresponding calls f0,0 and f0,1 and define u2 to
be the input to f1,1. The resulting function matches the illustration of S
3 in Fig. 3. In general,
if the function has r input blocks, where 2`−1 < r ≤ 2`, the idea is to have 2`−1 input blocks
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Sr for r ≥ 1 with ` = dlog2 re
1: procedure Sr(u0, . . . , ur−1)
2: for i = 0, . . . , 2(r − 2`−1)− 1 do
3: x0,i ← ui
4: y0,i ← f0,i mod 2(x0,i)
5: z0,i ← 0
6: for i = 0, . . . , r − 2`−1 − 1 do
7: x1,i ← (y ⊕ z)0,2i ⊕ (y ⊕ z)0,2i+1
8: y1,i ← f1,i mod 2(xj,i)
9: z1,i ← (y ⊕ z)0,2i
10: for i = r − 2`−1, . . . , 2`−1 − 1 do
11: x1,i ← ui+r−2`−1
12: y1,i ← f1,i mod 2(x1,i)
13: z1,i ← 0
14: for j = 2, . . . , ` and i = 0, . . . , 2`−j − 1 do
15: xj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i+1
16: yj,i ← fj,i mod 2(xj,i)
17: zj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i
18: return v ← (y ⊕ z)`,0
2 genSS3
u0 u1
u2
v
f0,0 f0,1
f1,0 f1,1
f2,0
x0,0 x0,1
x1,0 x1,1
x2,0
y0,0 y0,1
y1,0 y1,1
y2,0
z1,0
z2,0
Fig. 3: Sr for r ≥ 1 with ` = dlog2 re and an illustration of S3.
right before the second layer. This means that in the first layer, 2(r− 2`−1) input blocks have
to be processed to obtain r − 2`−1 blocks x1,i. These are then appended with the remaining
r− 2(r− 2`−1) = 2` − r compression function input blocks to obtain 2`−1 input values to the
second layer. From this point onwards, the function description is the same as in Fig. 2.
3 Security Model
For two sets S, T ⊆ {0, 1}n, we denote S ⊕ T = {s ⊕ t | (s, t) ∈ S × T}. For n ∈ N, we
denote by Func(n) the set of all functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and by Perm(n) its subset of all
permutations on n bits. We consider the security of Sr in the ideal model, where its underlying
primitives, denoted as a set P, are considered to be randomly drawn from Func(n). (Later
on, we consider Sr where its underlying functions fj,b are instantiated as fj,b(x) = pij,b(x)⊕x,
and in this case we consider Sr based on ideal permutations from Perm(n).) We consider
adversaries A that have unbounded computational power and query access to these random
primitives P, and their complexities are solely measured by the number of queries they make
to their oracles. We assume that the adversarial queries are stored in a query history Q.
We require that Q always contains the queries necessary for the evaluation of the mounted
collision or preimage attack.
Collision Resistance. Adversary A finds a collision for Sr if it obtains two distinct tuples
u = (u0, . . . , ur−1), u′ = (u′0, . . . , u′r−1) that satisfy Sr(u) = Sr(u′). The advantage of a
collision-finding adversary A is defined as
AdvcolSr [A] = P
[
P $←− Func(n)2dlog2 re+1, u, u′ ← AP : u 6= u′ ∧ Sr(u) = Sr(u′)
]
.
For a set of adversaries A, we define by AdvcolSr [A] the maximum advantage of any adversary
A ∈ A.
Preimage Resistance. We consider preimage security for every range point (also known as
everywhere preimage resistance [40]). Prior to making any query to its oracles, A is given a
range value v ∈ {0, 1}n, and A succeeds in finding a preimage for v if it detects a u satisfying
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Sr(u) = v. The success probability of A is then maximized over all possible chosen range
values. The advantage of an everywhere preimage-finding adversary A is defined as
AdvepreSr [A] = max
v ∈{0,1}n
P
[
P $←− Func(n)2dlog2 re+1, u← AP(v) : Sr(u) = v
]
.
For a set of adversaries A, we define by AdvepreSr [A] the maximum advantage of any adversary
A ∈ A.
Composition. Evidently, equivalent definitions can be given for functions F : {0, 1}s →
{0, 1}n based on a different amount of primitives P from Func(n), or even on different primi-
tives. We present the following useful lemma regarding the collision and preimage security of
G◦F for any hash or compression function F and any sufficiently strong finalization function
G based on P. One can think of F being Sr or even MD-Sr and G an element from Func(n).
Lemma 1. Consider G ◦ F based on random primitives P. Then, for any adversary A,
AdvcolG◦F [A] ≤ AdvcolG [A] + AdvcolF [A] , AdvepreG◦F [A] ≤ AdvepreG [A] .
Proof. For G ◦ F , denote the input to F as u, the input to G (the output of F ) as v and the
output of G as w. In order to find a collision for G◦F , the adversary needs to find two different
u, u′ with w = w′. Clearly, if the intermediate values v, v′ are distinct, such a collision implies
a collision for G, and otherwise it implies a collision for F . Next, for preimage resistance,
consider a given range value w, and assume the adversary finds a preimage u. Then, F (u) is
a preimage of w under G. uunionsq
4 Collision Security of Sr
In this section we analyze the collision resistance of Sr. First, in Sect. 4.1, we consider the
case of r = 2` (with security proofs in Sects. 4.2-4.3). Next, in Sect. 4.4 we show how the
result generalizes to arbitrary values of r.
4.1 Sr for r = 2`
We derive the following result for the collision resistance of Sr for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0 (Fig. 2).
Theorem 1. Let r = 2` with ` ≥ 0. Let Alw(q) denote the set of all adversaries that make at
most q queries and make those layer-wise (all queries to fj−1,b are made before all queries to
fj,b′ (for j = 1, . . . , ` and b, b
′ arbitrary)). Then, for any positive integer value τ ≥ 2,
AdvcolSr [Alw(q)] ≤
2(τ `q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
.
The proof is presented in Sect. 4.2. At a very high level, it is performed in a recursive manner:
we demonstrate that a collision for Sr either happens in the last round, or that “something
happened at an earlier stage.” In more detail, we first claim that associated to every query
(xj,b, yj,b) to fj,b there are at most τ
j possible values zj,b, for some threshold value τ . Then,
the adversary wins in either of the following two cases: (i) it finds a collision assuming that
our claim holds, or (ii) it breaks the claim. Putting τ = n1/` and recalling N = 2n, we find
that for any ε > 0,
AdvcolSr [Alw(N1/2/n1+ε)] ≤
2
n2ε
+ 2
(
2`e
n2ε
)n1/`
,
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Fig. 4: The function AdvcolSr [Alw(q)] of Thm. 1 for n = 256 for ` = 16, 8, 4, 2 (from left to right),
in comparison with the trivial bound q(q + 1)/2n (dashed line).
which approaches 0 for n→∞. For various `, the bound of Thm. 1 is depicted in Fig. 4.
Theorem 1 is restricted to adversaries that make their queries layer-wise (hence the “lw”
in Alw(q)). Intuitively, this does not limit the impact of the security proof: the best way for
an adversary to find a collision is to make queries to fj,b for increasing values of j in such
a way to obtain a maximal yield (the number of inputs to Sr that can be evaluated using
the queries made by the adversary). In fact, Shrimpton and Stam [45] already pointed out
that for S2 it is fair to just consider adversaries that query their oracles sequentially (top
layer first, bottom layer next). Unfortunately, the proof of Thm. 1 cannot straightforwardly
be generalized to the fully adaptive case due to a complicated technicality: a query to fj,b
influences all possible lower-level feed-forward values. Nevertheless, using a simple tweak it is
possible to generalize Thm. 1 to adaptive security up to about 2n/3 queries:
Theorem 2. Let r = 2` with ` ≥ 0. Let A(q) denote the set of all adversaries that make at
most q queries. Then, for any positive integer value τ ≥ 2,
AdvcolSr [A(q)] ≤
2(τ `q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
+
2τ2`q3
N
.
The proof is given in Sect. 4.3. We conjecture that this result can be improved to approxi-
mately 2n/2 collision secure (in the fully adaptive model).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We consider the security of Sr : {0, 1}rn → {0, 1}n, for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0, based on 2` + 1
functions
{
fj,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , ` − 1} × {0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}
}
randomly drawn from Func(n).
The focus is on adversaries that make all queries to fj−1,b before all queries to fj,b′ .
We consider any adversary A that has query access to its oracles P and makes q queries.
These queries are stored in a query history Q as indexed tuples of the form (xkj,b, ykj,b), where
k is the query index (omitted if irrelevant) and (j, b) refers to the oracle index. For q ≥ 0, by
Qq we define the query history after q queries.
Associated to each query (xj,b, yj,b) is a multiset Zj,b of all possible feed-forward values zj,b
occurring for this query. E.g., for a query (x0,0, y0,0) we have Z0,0 = {0}, and for an additional
query (x1,0, y1,0) for which also (x0,1, y0,0⊕x1,0) to f0,1 exists, Z1,0 = {y0,0}. Abusing notation,
we sometimes refer to the query and its feed-forward set as (xj,b, yj,b,Zj,b) or simply (x, y,Z)j,b.
We recall notation (y ⊕ z)j,b = yj,b ⊕ zj,b. Note that Zj,b is independent of the position at
which xj,b may occur in S
r: it may occur at position (j, b + 2λ) for λ ∈ {0, . . . , 2`−j−1 − 1},
but for every such position its corresponding feed-forward set is the same.
Denote by colSr(Qq) the event that A finds two distinct evaluations of Sr satisfying
Sr(u0, . . . , ur−1) = Sr(u′0, . . . , u′r−1). We write xj,i, yj,i, zj,i for all intermediate values corre-
sponding to the first evaluation and x′j,i, y
′
j,i, z
′
j,i for all values of the second evaluation. By
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definition:
AdvcolSr [A] = P [colSr(Qq)] . (1)
For the analysis of P [colSr(Qq)] we introduce two helping events. Here, let τ ≥ 2 be any
integer value.
eA(Q)j,b : ∃ (x, y,Z)j,b, (x′, y′,Z ′)j,b ∈ Qq such that
xj,b 6= x′j,b ∧ yj,b ⊕ y′j,b ∈ Zj,b ⊕Z ′j,b ;
eB(Q)j : max
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣{ (x, y,Z)j−1,0, (x, y,Z)j−1,1 ∈ Qq
∣∣
yj−1,0 ⊕ yj−1,1 ⊕ z ∈ Zj−1,0 ⊕Zj−1,1
}∣∣∣∣ > τ j .
We simply write eA(Q)j = eA(Q)j,0 ∪ eA(Q)j,1 and eX(Q) =
⋃
j eX(Q)j for X = A,B. We
furthermore write e(Q) = eA(Q) ∪ eB(Q). First, in Lem. 2, we demonstrate that finding a
collision is at least as hard as finding a solution for eA(Qq).
Lemma 2. colSr(Qq)⇒ eA(Qq).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume ¬eA(Qq), and suppose an adversary makes
all queries for the computation of Sr on input of two different vectors (u0, . . . , ur−1) and
(u′0, . . . , u′r−1). By construction:
Sr(u0, . . . , ur−1) = (y ⊕ z)`,0 = (y′ ⊕ z′)`,0 = Sr(u′0, . . . , u′r−1) .
First, assume x`,0 6= x′`,0. Then, the collision forms a valid solution to eA(Qq)`,0, contradicting
our assumption. Next, assume x`,0 = x
′
`,0. Then also y`,0 = y
′
`,0 and thus z`,0 = z
′
`,0. By
construction, this implies (y ⊕ z)`−1,0 = (y′ ⊕ z′)`−1,0 and (y ⊕ z)`−1,1 = (y′ ⊕ z′)`−1,1. Note
that Sr without the `th layer corresponds to two parallel independent Sr/2 evaluations: one
with inputs (u0, . . . , ur/2−1) and output (y⊕ z)`−1,0 and one with inputs (ur/2, . . . , ur−1) and
output (y ⊕ z)`−1,1. Given that the collision for Sr is non-trivial, it implies a non-trivial
collision of either of the two Sr/2’s. Consider the Sr/2 with the non-trivial collision, and apply
the same reasoning using eA(Qq)`−1,b. Here, b = 0 iff the non-trivial collision is in the left
half. At some point one indeed ends up with a distinct pair xj,i 6= x′j,i for some j = `, . . . , 0,
as (u0, . . . , ur−1) 6= (u′0, . . . , u′r−1). uunionsq
Therefore, we obtain for (1):
P [colSr(Qq)] ≤ P [eA(Qq)] ≤ P [e(Qq)] .
A bound on this probability is derived in Lem. 3.
Lemma 3. P [e(Qq)] ≤ 2(τ
`q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
.
Proof. Recall the notation e(Qq) = eA(Qq) ∪ eB(Qq). By basic probability theory:
P [e(Qq)] ≤
∑`
j=0
P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eB(Qq)j ] +
∑`
j=1
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−1] , (2)
noting that eB(Qq)0 is false by construction. We consider both probabilities separately.
We recall that A makes all queries to fj−1,b before all queries to fj,b′ . This particularly
means that, at the point of making queries to fj,b, the sets Zj,b are fixed (by all previous
queries) and remain unchanged. In more detail, we regularly use the following observation for
any query (x, y,Z)j,b to fj,b: ¬eB(Qq)j ⇒ |Zj,b| ≤ τ j .
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eA(Qq)j. Assume ¬eB(Qq)j holds. Consider any b and any two distinct queries (x, y,Z)j,b
and (x′, y′,Z ′)j,b to fj,b (at most
(
q
2
)
choices). These queries render a solution if yj,b ⊕ y′j,b ∈
Zj,b ⊕ Z ′j,b. By ¬eB(Qq)j , we have |Zj,b|, |Z ′j,b| ≤ τ j . Consequently, the two queries complete
the collision with probability at most τ
2j
N . Summing over all queries to fj,b, and both choices
of b, we obtain:
P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eB(Qq)j ] ≤ 2(τ
jq)2
2N
=
(τ jq)2
N
.
eB(Qq)j. Assume ¬e(Qq)j−1 holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n. By virtue of ¬eB(Qq)j−1, any
query (x, y,Z)j−1,0 has |Zj−1,0| ≤ τ j−1. Similar for any query (x, y,Z)j−1,1.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry) consider a new query (x, y,Z)j−1,0. This adds
a solution to eB(Qq)j with probability at most τ2(j−1)q/N , and any hit adds at most τ j−1
values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−1). More than τ j solutions are added with probability at most
(
q
τ j
τ j−1
)(
τ2(j−1)q
N
) τj
τj−1
≤
(
eτ2j−3q2
N
)τ
≤
(
e(τ jq)2
N
)τ
.
Summing over all N values z, we obtain:
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−1] ≤ N
(
e(τ jq)2
N
)τ
.
Conclusion of proof. From (2), we obtain:
P [e(Qq)] ≤
∑`
j=0
(τ jq)2
N
+
∑`
j=1
N
(
e(τ jq)2
N
)τ
=
q2
N
∑`
j=0
τ2j +N
(
eq2
N
)τ ∑`
j=1
τ2τj
≤ 2(τ
`q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
.
Here, we use that
∑`
j=0 x
j = x
`+1−1
x−1 ≤ xx−1x` ≤ 2x` for x ≥ 2. uunionsq
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of security against adaptive adversaries follows the proof of Thm. 1 in Sect. 4, but
differs in various aspects. First of all, we add the following event eC(Q):
eC(Q)j,b : ∃ (x, y,Z)kj−1,0, (x, y,Z)k
′
j−1,1, (x, y)
k′′
j,b ∈ Qq such that
max{k, k′} > k′′ ∧ yj−1,0 ⊕ yj−1,1 ⊕ xj,b ∈ Zj−1,0 ⊕Zj−1,1 .
We define eC(Q)j and eC(Q) similar as before and write e(Q) = eA(Q) ∪ eB(Q) ∪ eC(Q).
eC(Q) essentially covers the case that somewhere in the evaluation of Sr a fork (y⊕ z)j−1,0⊕
(y ⊕ z)j−1,1 = xj,b is completed by an upper-level query. It could essentially also be the case
that k′′ > k, k′ but a new query results in a fresh element in Zj−1,0, therewith rendering a
hit, but in this case the query would invalidate eC(Q) in the first place (for an earlier value of
j). Intuitively, assuming ¬eC(Qq), we can indeed consider the adversary to make its queries
layer-wise.
Lemma 2 still holds, and
P [colSr(Qq)] ≤ P [eA(Qq)] ≤ P [e(Qq)] .
A bound on this probability is derived in Lem. 4. It is similar to Lem.3.
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Lemma 4. P [e(Qq)] ≤ 2(τ
`q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
+
2τ2`q3
N
.
Proof. Recall the notation e(Qq) = eA(Qq) ∪ eB(Qq) ∪ eC(Qq). Write eBC(Qq) = eB(Qq) ∪
eC(Qq). By basic probability theory:
P [e(Qq)] ≤
∑`
j=0
P
[
eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBC(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
+
∑`
j=1
P
[
eB(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
+ P
[
eC(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
.
(3)
Indeed, e(Qq) should be triggered for some j. Therefore, we consider any j, assume e(Qq)j′
has not been triggered for any j′ < j, and consider the probability that a query for this
specific value of j triggers e(Q)j . This event can then be further divided into a success for
eA(Qq)j , eB(Qq)j , or eC(Qq)j .
eA(Qq)j. Assume ¬eBC(Qq)j∩∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′ holds. Consider any b. The equation of eA(Qq)j
could get satisfied in two ways: (i) via a query to fj,b, or (ii) via a query (x, y)j′,b′ for j
′ < j
that results in a new value in Zj,b for any older query (x, y)j,b. However, in case (ii) the query
to fj′,b′ triggered eC(Q)j′+1, which is impossible by assumption. The remaining analysis is
the same as in Lem. 3, and we obtain:
P
[
eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBC(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
≤ (τ
jq)2
N
.
eB(Qq)j. Assume ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′ holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n. The equation of eB(Qq)j
could get satisfied in two ways: (i) via a query (x, y,Z)j−1,0 or (x, y,Z)j−1,1, or (ii) via a
query (x, y,Z)j′,b′ for j′ < j − 1 that results in a new value in either Zj−1,0 for any older
query (x, y)j−1,0 or Zj−1,1 for any older query (x, y)j−1,1. However, in case (ii) the query to
fj′,b′ triggered eC(Q)j′+1, which is impossible by assumption. Therefore, it suffices to consider
the case a fresh query to fj−1,0 or fj−1,1 makes the equation satisfied. The remaining analysis
is the same as in Lem. 3, and we obtain:
P
[
eB(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
≤ N
(
e(τ jq)2
N
)τ
.
eC(Qq)j. Assume ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′ holds. Similar to eB(Qq)j , by assumption the equation
of eC(Qq)j could only be triggered via a query (x, y,Z)j−1,0 or (x, y,Z)j−1,1. Any query
(x, y,Z)j−1,0 has |Zj−1,0| ≤ τ j−1, due to ¬eB(Qq)j−1, and similar for any (x, y,Z)j−1,1.
Consider the max{k, k′}th query. There are at most q2 choices for the other two queries,
and it adds a solution to eC(Qq)j,b with probability at most τ2(j−1)q2/N . Summing over all
queries, we eventually find:
P
[
eC(Qq)j ∩ ∩j−1j′=1¬e(Qq)j′
]
≤ τ
2jq3
N
.
Conclusion of proof. The proof is now completed via (3), as in Lem. 3. uunionsq
4.4 Sr for Arbitrary r
The previous analysis carries over to the generalized Sr (Fig. 3) almost verbatim, with the
difference that we take ` = dlog2 re. The only technical change lies in the sets Zj,b associated
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to the queries: a query to fj,b may occur in an evaluation of S
r at position (j, b + 2λ) for
λ ∈ {0, . . . , 2`−j−1 − 1}, and due to the asymmetric character of Sr it may have two different
feed-forward sets. For the proof of Lem. 3 this concretely means that we need to consider two
feed-forward sets associated with every query. This affects the bound as follows: regarding
eA(Qq)j we end up with bound (2τ
jq)2
N . For eB(Q)j , a collision is found with probability at
most (2τ j−1)2q/N and any hit adds at most 2τ j−1 values. Using τ ≥ 2, this results in the
same bound for eB(Q)j :
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−1] ≤ N
(
e(23τ2j−3q)2
N
)τ
≤ N
(
e(τ jq)2
N
)τ
.
Hence, as a direct corollary of Thm. 1 and Thm. 2 (to which the same reasoning applies), we
find:
Corollary 1. Let r ≥ 1 with ` = dlog2 re. Let Alw(q) be as in Thm. 1, and A(q) as in Thm. 2.
Then, for any positive integer value τ ≥ 2,
AdvcolSr [Alw(q)] ≤
8(τ `q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
,
AdvcolSr [A(q)] ≤
8(τ `q)2
N
+ 2N
(
e(τ `q)2
N
)τ
+
8τ2`q3
N
.
The asymptotic behavior of the bounds remains the same.
5 Preimage Security of Sr
Theorem 1 trivially implies preimage security up to the birthday bound. For r = 1, 2, we
derive the following result in the fully adaptive model. This result particularly solves an open
problem of Shrimpton and Stam [45], namely to prove 2n/3-bit preimage security of their
design (optimal w.r.t. the bounds of Rogaway and Steinberger [41]).
Theorem 3. Let r ∈ {1, 2}. Let A(q) be as in Thm. 2. Then, for any positive integer value
τ ≥ 2,
Advepre
S1
[A(q)] ≤ q
N
, Advepre
S2
[A(q)] ≤ τq
N
+
q3
N2
+ (N + 2)
(
2eq2
τN
)τ/2
.
The proof is given in Sect. 5.1. Similar to Thm. 1, we can put τ = N1/3, and find that for
any ε > 0, Advepre
S2
[A(N2/3/nε)] approaches 0 for n→∞. Unfortunately, the proof cannot be
easily generalized to larger r: the threshold value τ ` starts exploding for ` ≥ 2.
We remark that Sr (or MD-Sr) for r ≥ 2 can be made preimage resistant up to N queries
by adding one single primitive call at the end of its evaluation (now only for Sr, a similar
claim for MD-Sr was already made in Sect. 1):
Theorem 4. Let r ≥ 1 with ` = dlog2 re. Suppose P =
{
fj,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , ` − 1} ×
{0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}} ∪ {f} $←− Func(n)2`+2. Let A(q) be as in Thm. 2. Then,
Advepref◦Sr [A(q)] ≤
q
N
.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Lem. 1 and Thm. 3, noting S1 = f . uunionsq
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5.1 Proof of Theorem 3
S1 is equal to f0,0 and the result is trivial. We proceed with S
2. We employ the same conven-
tions and notations as in the proof of Sect. 4. As before, we consider any adversary A that
has query access to its oracles P and makes q queries. Recall that Z0,b = {0} for b = 0, 1. In
fact, we only need Z1,0 and therefore we will discard the notion entirely (and write everything
explicitly).
Let v ∈ {0, 1}n be the challenged range value. Denote by preS2(Qq) the event that A finds
an evaluation of S2 satisfying S2(u0, u1) = v. By definition:
Advepre
S2
[A] = P
[
preS2(Qq)
]
. (4)
For the analysis of P
[
preS2(Qq)
]
we introduce four helping events. Here, let τ ≥ 2 be any
integer value.
eA(Q)j,b : ∃ distinct (x, y)j,b, (x′, y′)j,b, (x′′, y′′)j,b ∈ Qq such that
yj,b = y
′
j,b = y
′′
j,b or (x⊕ y)j,b = (x′ ⊕ y′)j,b = (x′′ ⊕ y′′)j,b ;
eB(Q) : max
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣{(x, y)0,0, (x, y)0,1 ∈ Qq ∣∣ y0,0 ⊕ y0,1 = z}∣∣ > τ ;
eC(Q) : ∣∣{(x, y)0,1, (x, y)1,0 ∈ Qq ∣∣ y0,1 ⊕ (x⊕ y)1,0 = v}∣∣ > τ ;
eD(Q) : ∣∣{(x, y)0,0, (x, y)1,0 ∈ Qq ∣∣ y0,0 ⊕ y1,0 = v}∣∣ > τ .
We write eA(Q) = eA(Q)0,0 ∪ eA(Q)0,1 ∪ eA(Q)1,0, eBCD(Q) = eB(Q) ∪ eC(Q) ∪ eD(Q), and
e(Q) = eA(Q) ∪ eBCD(Q). In Lem. 5, we demonstrate that finding a preimage assuming
¬eBCD(Qq) happens with probability at most τqN .
Lemma 5. P
[
preS2(Qq) ∩ ¬eBCD(Qq)
] ≤ τq
N
.
Proof. Assume ¬eBCD(Qq). We make a distinction among queries made to f0,0, f0,1, and f1,0.
Starting with a query (x, y)1,0 to f1,0, it renders a preimage for S
2 if y1,0 ⊕ y0,0 = v for
some older queries (x, y)0,0, (x, y)0,1 satisfying y0,0 ⊕ y0,1 = x1,0. By ¬eB(Qq), there are at
most τ such solutions. Consequently, the query results in a preimage with probability at most
τ
N .
Next, for a query (x, y)0,0 to f0,0, it results in a preimage if y1,0⊕y0,0 = v and y0,0⊕y0,1 =
x1,0 for some older queries (x, y)0,1, (x, y)1,0. By ¬eC(Qq), there are at most τ solutions to
y1,0 ⊕ v = y0,1 ⊕ x1,0. Consequently, the query results in a preimage with probability at most
τ
N .
Finally, for a query (x, y)0,1 to f0,1, it gives a preimage if y0,0 ⊕ y0,1 = x1,0 for some older
queries (x, y)0,0, (x, y)1,0 satisfying y1,0 ⊕ y0,0 = v. By ¬eD(Qq), there are at most τ such
solutions. Consequently, the query results in a preimage with probability at most τN .
Summing over all queries, we obtain our bound. uunionsq
Therefore, we obtain for (4):
P
[
preS2(Qq)
] ≤ τq
N
+ P [eBCD(Qq)] ≤ τq
N
+ P [e(Qq)] .
A bound on P [e(Qq)] is derived in Lem. 6.
Lemma 6. P [e(Qq)] ≤ q
3
N2
+ (N + 2)
(
2eq2
τN
)τ/2
.
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Proof. By basic probability theory:
P [e(Qq)] ≤ P [eA(Qq)] + P [eB(Qq) ∩ ¬eA(Qq)] +
P [eC(Qq) ∩ ¬eA(Qq)] + P [eD(Qq) ∩ ¬eA(Qq)] .
(5)
We consider the four probabilities separately.
eA(Qq). Consider any j, b and any three distinct queries (x, y)j,b, (x′, y′)j,b, and (x′′, y′′)j,b to
fj,b (at most
(
q
3
)
choices). These queries render a solution if yj,b = y
′
j,b = y
′′
j,b or (x ⊕ y)j,b =
(x′ ⊕ y′)j,b = (x′′ ⊕ y′′)j,b, which happens with probability at most 2N2 . Summing over all
queries to fj,b, and all choices of j, b (three in total), we obtain:
P [eA(Qq)] ≤ q
3
N2
.
eB(Qq). Assume ¬eA(Qq) holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n. Without loss of generality (by
symmetry) consider a new query (x, y)0,1. This adds a solution to eB(Qq) with probability
at most q/N , and any hit adds at most 2 solutions (by ¬eA(Qq)). More than τ solutions are
added with probability at most
( q
τ/2
) ( q
N
)τ/2 ≤ (2eq2τN )τ/2. Summing over all N values z, we
obtain:
P [eB(Qq) ∩ ¬eA(Qq)] ≤ N
(
2eq2
τN
)τ/2
.
eC(Qq) and eD(Qq). The analysis is similar to eB(Qq) except that there is no need to sum
over all values z.
Conclusion of proof. The proof is now completed via (5). uunionsq
6 Instantiation Using Permutations
In this section, we discuss the effect of instantiating Sr with random permutations pij,b instead
of random functions fj,b. The most basic and well-established way is to set fj,b(x) = pij,b(x)⊕x,
and we consider Sr with its underlying primitives transformed this way. For ease of presen-
tation, we focus on Sr for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0, but the findings carry over to the general
setting.
For the top layer of Sr, the feed-forward of x in f0,b is necessary: in absence of it, it suffices
for an adversary to find a collision with these calls eliminated and to just make r inverse calls
afterwards. However, for the remaining evaluations of fj,b (with j ≥ 1), the feed-forward x is
pointless: it simply corresponds to reflecting Sr along its vertical axis.4 Thus, we focus on Sr
with f0,b(x) = pi0,b(x) ⊕ x (for b ∈ {0, 1}) and fj,b(x) = pij,b(x) (for (j, b) ∈ ({1, . . . , ` − 1} ×
{0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}), where {pij,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , ` − 1} × {0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}} $←− Perm(n)2`+1.
A formal description is given in Fig. 5.
Starting with collision resistance, we transform Thm. 1 to the permutation-based setting.
Theorem 5. Let r = 2` with ` ≥ 0. Suppose P = {pij,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , ` − 1} × {0, 1}) ∪
{(`, 0)}} $←− Perm(n)2`+1. Let Alw(q) be as in Thm. 1. Then, for any positive integer value
τ ≥ 3,
AdvcolSr [Alw(q)] ≤
4(τ `q)2
N − q + 8N
(
e(τ `q)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
4 In more detail, in Sr of Fig. 2, the feed-forward (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i in round (j, i) would be replaced by (y ⊕
z)j−1,2i+1.
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Sr for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0
1: procedure Sr(u0, . . . , ur−1)
2: for i = 0, . . . , 2` − 1 do
3: x0,i ← ui
4: y0,i ← pi0,i mod 2(x0,i)
5: z0,i ← x0,i
6: for j = 1, . . . , ` and i = 0, . . . , 2`−j − 1 do
7: xj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i+1
8: yj,i ← pij,i mod 2(xj,i)
9: zj,i ← (y ⊕ z)j−1,2i
10: return v ← (y ⊕ z)`,0
5 genSSpi4
u0 u1 u2 u3
v
x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3
x1,0 x1,1
x2,0
y0,0 y0,1 y0,2 y0,3
y1,0 y1,1
y2,0
z1,0 z1,1
z2,0
pi0,0 pi0,1 pi0,0 pi0,1
pi1,0 pi1,1
pi2,0
Fig. 5: Alternative permutation-based description of Sr of Fig. 2 and an illustration of S4.
The proof is in the same spirit as the one of Thm. 1 but is technically more demanding and
is included in App. B. Theorem 2 (for fully adaptive adversaries) and Cor. 1 (for arbitrary
r ≥ 1) generalize in a similar way.
Unfortunately, the preimage result of Thm. 3 does not carry over to the permutation-based
case: a preimage for S2 can be found in approximately 2n/2 queries [31, 45]. In Thm. 6 we
generalize the attack to the case r = 2` with ` ≥ 1; it generalizes to arbitrary r ≥ 2 the
obvious way.
Theorem 6. Let r = 2` with ` ≥ 1. Suppose P = {pij,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , ` − 1} × {0, 1}) ∪
{(`, 0)}} $←− Perm(n)2`+1. Let A((2r−1)q) denote the set of all adversaries that make at most
(2r − 1)q queries. Then,
AdvepreSr [A((2r − 1)q)] ≥
q2
N
.
Proof. Let v be any given range value. We consider the following adversary. First, for k =
1, . . . , q, it randomly selects a tuple (u0, . . . , ur/2−1)k, computes the left half of Sr up to
(y ⊕ z)k`−1,0, and queries xk`,0 ← pi−1`,0 (v ⊕ (y ⊕ z)k`−1,0). Next, for k′ = 1, . . . , q, it randomly
selects a tuple (ur/2+1, . . . , ur)
k′ and computes the right half of Sr up to (y ⊕ z)k′`−1,1. A
preimage for Sr is found if there exist k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that
(y ⊕ z)k`−1,0 ⊕ xk`,0 = (y ⊕ z)k
′
`−1,1 .
This happens with probability at least q
2
N . uunionsq
Nevertheless, the trick of applying a postprocessing pi(x)⊕x to Sr to get 2n preimage security
(cf. Thm. 4) still applies.
7 Conclusion
Our generalized Sr compression function design achieves high efficiency, approaching rate
1/2 using primitives of state size. The function can be used in a Merkle-Damg˚ard mode
of operation or in a Merkle tree. Compared with recent designs such as Sponge functions,
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Grøstl, and MD6, Sr achieves asymptotically the same collision security and offers comparable
rates, but using primitives that are at least twice as small, saving a significant amount of
computational overhead. However, we acknowledge that Sr uses more distinct primitives.
Depending on the application, Sr may be more suitable than the other schemes, and it
complements well to these designs.
Sr can be securely instantiated using non-compressing one-way functions or permutations,
but our targeted generality comes at a technical price: the asymptotic n/2-bit collision security
is only proven in a setting where the adversary is limited to making its queries layer-wise.
Although we present a proof in the fully adaptive model up to 2n/3 queries, we expect this
bound to be non-optimal and conjecture (almost) optimal collision security of Sr in the
adaptive model.
The proof of Sr requires 2dlog2 re+ 1 distinct primitives: one primitive for the last layer,
and two for every but last layer. While this requirement has a partly technical cause, it is far
from trivial to analyze Sr with less distinct primitives. For instance, in the permutation-based
setting (see Fig. 5), S2 and S3 are insecure if pi`,0 = pi`−1,1: putting x`−1,1 = pi−1`−1,1((y⊕z)`−1,0)
yields hash value 0, for arbitrary (y ⊕ z)`−1,0. It is unclear how these observations generalize
to larger Sr (based on one-way functions or permutations), and this remains an interesting
open research problem.
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A Comparison of Sr With Known Permutation Based Hash Functions
We present technical support for Table 1 of Sect. 1. In more detail, we compute the rates and
primitive sizes of Sponge functions, Grøstl, and MD6, and of Sr when in a Merkle-Damg˚ard
mode of operation or in a Merkle tree. As these functions are all defined for different modes of
operation and different parameters, separate treatments are required. In our comparison, we
target hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n with n/2-bit security; we adopt the parameters
for the specific designs alike, and derive the rates and the primitive sizes.
Note that for H we can define the rate similarly as in Sect. 1, namely as Mds , where M
denotes the total length of the message in bits, and d denotes the number of calls to the
underlying s-bit non-compressing primitive f . We simplify the analysis by assuming that the
message is always of full length (ignoring additional primitive calls due to padding, length
strengthening, and final transformations). In the remainder of this section, we derive the
rates and primitive sizes for the above-mentioned functions. A further comparison is given in
Sect. 1.
Sponge Functions. Sponge functions [9] have a state of c+m bits, where c is the capacity
and m the message block size (see footnote 1). Sponge functions are collision resistant up to
2c/2 queries [6]. Hence, n/2-bit security means that we take c = n. Its compression function
F : {0, 1}n+2m → {0, 1}n+m makes one primitive call to a (n+m)-bit permutation. On input
of a message of M blocks of m bits, it makes M primitive calls, and thus has rate mn+m using
primitives on n+m bits. The same reasoning applies to Keccak (as it is a Sponge function) [8],
Grindahl [27], JH [50], and parazoa functions [4].
Grøstl. Grøstl [21] is a Merkle-Damg˚ard function. It has a state size of l bits and collision
security is proven up to 2l/4 queries [3] (hence, we consider l = 2n). It employs a compression
function F : {0, 1}2l → {0, 1}l making two primitive calls to two distinct l-bit permutations.
On input of a message of M blocks of l bits, it makes 2M primitive calls, and thus has a rate
of 1/2 using primitives on 2n bits.
MD6. MD6 [39] is a tree-based hash function with output size 16 words of w = 64 bits (we
write the output size as n = 16w). Collision security is proven up to 2n/2 queries [18]. It
employs a compression function F : {0, 1}4n → {0, 1}n making one primitive call to a 4n-bit
permutation. (In fact, F and its underlying permutation get 25 additional words of input,
but these are ignored for the sake of simplicity. Taking these into account leads to a worse
rate.) On input of a message of M blocks of n bits (w.l.o.g. M = 4α for some α), it makes
M−1
3 primitive calls, and thus has a rate of 3/4
M
M−1 using primitives on 4n bits.
Sr in MD or MT. For the comparison with Sponge functions and Grøstl, we consider Sr
in a Merkle-Damg˚ard mode of operation (MD-Sr) [16,33], and for the comparison with MD6
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we consider it in a Merkle tree (MT-Sr) [32]. Both MD-Sr and MT-Sr preserve collision
resistance [7,16,18,33] when correctly padded and have about 2n/2 collision resistance. First
consider MD-Sr. On input of a message of M blocks of n bits (w.l.o.g. M = (r−1)α for some
α), it makes (2r−1)Mr−1 primitive calls, and thus has a rate of
r−1
2r−1 using primitives on n bits.
Next consider MT-Sr. On input of a message of M blocks of n bits (w.l.o.g. M = rα for some
α), it makes M−1r−1 primitive calls, and thus has a rate of
r−1
2r−1
M
M−1 using primitives on n bits.
B Proof of Theorem 5
We consider the security of Sr : {0, 1}rn → {0, 1}n, for r = 2` with ` ≥ 0, based on 2` + 1
functions
{
pij,b | (j, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , `− 1} × {0, 1}) ∪ {(`, 0)}
}
randomly drawn from Perm(n).
See Fig. 5. In the proof we consider adversaries that make all queries to pij−1,b before all
queries to pij,b′ .
The proof shows similarities with the proof of Thm. 1 but is more technical. As before,
we associate to each query (xj,b, yj,b) a multiset Zj,b of all possible feed-forward values zj,b
occurring for this query. The only difference is that now for queries (x0,b, y0,b) we have Z0,b =
{x0,b}. We recall that (xj,b, yj,b,Zj,b) = (x, y,Z)j,b, and again write (y⊕ z)j,b = yj,b ⊕ zj,b and
similarly (x⊕ y)j,b = xj,b ⊕ yj,b.
In the proof we employ four helping events. Here, let τ ≥ 3 be any integer value.
eA(Q)j,b : ∃ (x, y,Z)j,b, (x′, y′,Z ′)j,b ∈ Qq such that
xj,b 6= x′j,b ∧ yj,b ⊕ y′j,b ∈ Zj,b ⊕Z ′j,b ;
eB(Q)j,b : max
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣{ (x, y,Z)j−1,0, (x, y,Z)j,b ∈ Qq
∣∣
yj,b 6= z ∧ yj,b ⊕ yj−1,0 ⊕ z ∈ Zj,b ⊕Zj−1,0
}∣∣∣∣ > τ j+1/2 ;
eC(Q)j : max
z∈{0,1}n\{0}
∣∣∣∣{ (x, y,Z)j−1,0, (x′, y′,Z ′)j−1,0 ∈ Qq
∣∣
yj−1,0 ⊕ y′j−1,0 ⊕ z ∈ Zj−1,0 ⊕Z ′j−1,0
}∣∣∣∣ > τ j ;
eD(Q)j : max
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣{ (x, y,Z)j−1,0, (x, y,Z)j−1,1 ∈ Qq
∣∣
yj−1,0 ⊕ yj−1,1 ⊕ z ∈ Zj−1,0 ⊕Zj−1,1
}∣∣∣∣ > τ j .
For X,Y ∈ {A, . . . ,D}, we simply write eX(Q)j = eX(Q)j,0 ∪ eX(Q)j,1, eX(Q) =
⋃
j eX(Q)j ,
and eXY(Q) = eX(Q)∪ eY(Q). We furthermore write e(Q) = eA · · ·D(Q). Note that eA(Q)j,b
is as in Thm. 1, and eD(Q)j replaces eB(Q)j .
The threshold values for eB(Q)j,b on one hand and eCD(Q)j on the other hand differ. This
has a technical origin, and we present a brief and informal explanation. Write the two bounds
as τBj and τCDj . As will become clear in the proof of Lem. 7, any adversarial query adds at
most τBj−1 solutions to eC(Q)j and eD(Q)j , and at most τCDj solutions to eB(Q)j,b. Hence,
in order for our proof to make sense, we require τBj > τCDj > τBj−1, which justifies the
choice of τBj = τ
j+1/2 and τCDj = τ
j .
The definition colSr(Qq) of the proof of Thm. 1 carries over to the permutation-based
setting, as well as Lem. 2. We obtain:
AdvcolSr [A] = P [colSr(Qq)] ≤ P [eA(Qq)] ≤ P [e(Qq)] .
A bound on this probability is derived in Lem. 7.
Lemma 7. P [e(Qq)] ≤ 4(τ
`q)2
N − q + 8N
(
e(τ `q)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
Proof. By basic probability theory:
P [e(Qq)] ≤
∑`
j=0
P [e(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] , (6)
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where ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1 = ¬e(Qq)j−2 ∩¬e(Qq)j−1, and eBCD(Qq)0 is false by construction. We
further split up this probability as follows:
P [e(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ≤ P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] +
P [eBCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1]
≤ P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] +
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬eCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] +
P [eCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1]
≤ P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] +
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬eCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] +
P [eC(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1]
P [eD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ,
(7)
We consider these probabilities separately. Recall that A makes all queries to pij−1,b before
all queries to pij,b′ (for j = 1, . . . , ` and b, b
′ arbitrary). Throughout the proof, by “for any
(x, y, z)j,b” we mean “for any (x, y,Z)j,b and any zj,b ∈ Zj,b.” Hence, any tuple (x, y,Z)j,b
corresponds to |Zj,b| tuples (x, y, z)j,b.
eA(Qq)j. Assume ¬eBD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1 holds. Consider any b. The analysis depends
on whether the query is forward or inverse. First, consider a forward query yj,b ← pij,b(xj,b).
We say that it renders a solution if it makes yj,b ⊕ y′j,b ∈ Zj,b ⊕Z ′j,b satisfied for any existing
query (x′, y′,Z ′)j,b. By ¬eD(Qq)j , we have |Zj,b|, |Z ′j,b| ≤ τ j (these sets are fixed once xj,b
is fixed). Consequently, the query completes a collision with probability at most τ
2jq
N−q . Next,
consider an inverse query xj,b ← pi−1j,b (yj,b). It renders a solution if for some (x, y, z)j−1,0,
(x, y, z)j−1,1, and (x′, y′, z′)j,b:
xj,b = (y ⊕ z)j−1,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,1 ,
yj,b = (y ⊕ z)j−1,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)′j,b .
(Indeed, in this case zj,b = (y ⊕ z)j−1,0.) By ¬eB(Qq)j for z := yj,b (by condition, we have
y′j,b 6= yj,b), there are at most τ j+1/2 solutions (x, y, z)j−1,0 and (x′, y′, z′)j,b to the second
equation (using ¬eA(Qq)j−1). By ¬eD(Qq)j−1, there are also at most τ j−1q solutions for
(x, y, z)j−1,1, and a collision is thus triggered with probability at most τ
2j−1/2q
N−q . Summing over
all forward and inverse queries to pij,b, and both choices of b, we obtain:
P [eA(Qq)j ∩ ¬eBD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ≤ 2(τ
jq)2
N − q .
eB(Qq)j. Assume ¬eCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1 holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n and any b.
By the layer-wise character of A, eB(Qq)j,b can only be satisfied by queries to pij,b. The anal-
ysis depends on whether the query is forward or inverse. First, consider a forward query
yj,b ← pij,b(xj,b). There exists at most q queries (x, y,Z)j−1,0. By ¬eD(Qq)j−1, we have
|Zj−1,0| ≤ τ j−1. Additionally, by ¬eD(Qq)j , we have |Zj,b| ≤ τ j (this set is fixed once
xj,b is fixed). Therefore, the query adds a solution to eB(Qq)j,b with probability at most
τ2j−1q
N−q , and any hit adds at most τ
j values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−1). Next, consider an inverse
query xj,b ← pi−1j,b (yj,b) (and assume yj,b 6= z). It renders a solution if for some (x, y, z)j−1,0,
(x, y, z)j−1,1, and (x′, y′, z′)j−1,0:
xj,b = (y ⊕ z)j−1,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,1 ,
yj,b = (y ⊕ z)j−1,0 ⊕ (y′ ⊕ z′)j−1,0 ⊕ z .
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(Indeed, in this case zj,b = (y⊕ z)j−1,0.) By ¬eC(Qq)j for z := yj,b ⊕ z 6= 0, there are at most
τ j solutions (x, y, z)j−1,0 and (x′, y′, z′)j−1,0 to the second equation (using ¬eA(Qq)j−2). By
¬eD(Qq)j−1, there are also at most τ j−1q solutions for (x, y, z)j−1,1, and a solution is thus
obtained with probability at most τ
2j−1q
N−q . Any hit adds at most τ
j values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−1).
More than τ j+1/2 solutions are added with probability at most(
q
τ j+1/2/τ j
)(
τ2j−1q
N − q
)τ j+1/2/τ j
≤
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2
.
Summing over all N choices of z, and both choices of b, we obtain:
P [eB(Qq)j ∩ ¬eCD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ≤ 2N
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2
.
eC(Qq)j. Assume ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1 holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n\{0}. Note that, by
eC(Qq)j−1, there exist at most τ j−1 solutions in case of yj−1,0 = y′j−1,0. Hence, in order
to find more than τ j solutions, the adversary needs to find more than τ j−τ j−1 solutions with
yj−1,0 6= y′j−1,0, and we focus on this problem. The analysis depends on whether the query
is forward or inverse. First, consider a forward query yj−1,0 ← pij−1,0(xj−1,0). There exist
at most q other tuples (x′, y′,Z ′)j−1,0, and by ¬eD(Qq)j−1 we have |Zj−1,0|, |Z ′j−1,0| ≤ τ j−1
(these sets are fixed once xj−1,0 is fixed). Therefore, the query adds a solution to eC(Qq)j
with probability at most τ
2(j−1)q
N−q , and any hit adds at most τ
j−1 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−1).
Next, consider an inverse query xj−1,0 ← pi−1j−1,0(yj−1,0). It renders a solution if for some
(x, y, z)j−2,0, (x, y, z)j−2,1, and (x′, y′, z′)j−1,0:
xj−1,0 = (y ⊕ z)j−2,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−2,1 ,
yj−1,0 = (y ⊕ z)j−2,0 ⊕ (y′ ⊕ z′)j−1,0 ⊕ z .
(Indeed, in this case zj−1,0 = (y⊕ z)j−2,0.) We make a distinction between the cases yj−1,0 ⊕
z = y′j−1,0 and yj−1,0 ⊕ z 6= y′j−1,0; an adversary may succeed in both cases. In the former
case, the values yj−1,0 and z fix y′j−1,0 (recall yj−1,0 6= y′j−1,0), and by ¬eD(Qq)j−1, we have
|Z ′j−1,0| ≤ τ j−1. By ¬eA(Qq)j−2, there is one solution (x, y, z)j−2,0 to the second equation.
By ¬eD(Qq)j−2, there are also at most τ j−2q solutions for (x, y, z)j−2,1, and a solution is thus
obtained with probability at most τ
2j−3q
N−q . Any hit adds at most τ
j−1 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−2).
Next, we consider the general case of yj−1,0 ⊕ z 6= y′j−1,0. By ¬eB(Qq)j−1 for z := yj−1,0 ⊕ z
(for which we thus have y′j−1,0 6= yj−1,0 ⊕ z), there are at most τ j−1/2 solutions (x, y, z)j−2,0
and (x′, y′, z′)j−1,0 to the second equation (using ¬eA(Qq)j−2∩j−1). By ¬eD(Qq)j−2, there are
also at most τ j−2q solutions for (x, y, z)j−2,1, and a solution is thus obtained with probability
at most τ
2j−5/2q
N−q . Any hit adds at most τ
j−1/2 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−2). Concluding the inverse
case, a hit is found with probability at most τ
2j−3q
N−q +
τ2j−5/2q
N−q ≤ τ
2(j−1)q
N−q (where inequality holds
as 1 + τ1/2 ≤ τ for τ ≥ 3) and any hit adds at most τ j−1 + τ j−1/2 values.
More than τ j − τ j−1 solutions are added with probability at most(
q
(τ j − τ j−1)/(τ j−1 + τ j−1/2)
)(
τ2(j−1)q
N − q
)(τ j−τ j−1)/(τ j−1+τ j−1/2)
≤
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
Here, we again use that 1 + τ1/2 ≤ τ and that τ j − τ j−1 ≥ τ j−1. Summing over all N −1 ≤ N
choices of z, we obtain:
P [eC(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ≤ N
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
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eD(Qq)j. Assume ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1 holds. Consider any z ∈ {0, 1}n. Without loss of generality
(by symmetry) consider a new query (x, y,Z)j−1,0. The analysis depends on whether the
query is forward or inverse. First, consider a forward query yj−1,0 ← pij−1,0(xj−1,0). There
exist at most q other tuples (x, y,Z)j−1,1, and by ¬eD(Qq)j−1 we have |Zj−1,0|, |Zj−1,1| ≤ τ j−1
(these sets are fixed once xj−1,0 is fixed). Therefore, the query adds a solution to eD(Qq)j
with probability at most τ
2(j−1)q
N−q , and any hit adds at most τ
j−1 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−1).
Next, consider an inverse query xj−1,0 ← pi−1j−1,0(yj−1,0). It renders a solution if for some
(x, y, z)j−2,0, (x, y, z)j−2,1, and (x, y, z)j−1,1:
xj−1,0 = (y ⊕ z)j−2,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−2,1 ,
yj−1,0 = (y ⊕ z)j−2,0 ⊕ (y ⊕ z)j−1,1 ⊕ z .
(Indeed, in this case zj−1,0 = (y⊕z)j−2,0.) We make a distinction between the cases yj−1,0⊕z =
yj−1,1 and yj−1,0⊕z 6= yj−1,1; an adversary may succeed in both cases. In the former case, the
values yj−1,0 and z fix yj−1,1, and by ¬eD(Qq)j−1, we have |Zj−1,1| ≤ τ j−1. By ¬eA(Qq)j−2,
there is one solution (x, y, z)j−2,0 to the second equation. By ¬eD(Qq)j−2, there are also
at most τ j−2q solutions for (x, y, z)j−2,1, and a solution is thus obtained with probability
at most τ
2j−3q
N−q . Any hit adds at most τ
j−1 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−2). Next, we consider the
general case of yj−1,0 ⊕ z 6= yj−1,1. By ¬eB(Qq)j−1 for z := yj−1,0 ⊕ z (for which we thus
have yj−1,1 6= yj−1,0 ⊕ z), there are at most τ j−1/2 solutions (x, y, z)j−2,0 and (x, y, z)j−1,1 to
the second equation (using ¬eA(Qq)j−2∩j−1). By ¬eD(Qq)j−2, there are also at most τ j−2q
solutions for (x, y, z)j−2,1, and a solution is thus obtained with probability at most τ
2j−5/2q
N−q .
Any hit adds at most τ j−1/2 values (by ¬eA(Qq)j−2). Concluding the inverse case, a hit
is found with probability at most τ
2j−3q
N−q +
τ2j−5/2q
N−q ≤ τ
2(j−1)q
N−q and any hit adds at most
τ j−1 + τ j−1/2 values.
More than τ j solutions are added with probability at most
(
q
τ j/(τ j−1 + τ j−1/2)
)(
τ2(j−1)q
N − q
)τ j/(τ j−1+τ j−1/2)
≤
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
Summing over all N choices of z, we obtain:
P [eD(Qq)j ∩ ¬e(Qq)j−2∩j−1] ≤ N
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
Conclusion of proof. From (6) and (7), and simplifying the above bounds, we obtain:
P [e(Qq)] ≤
∑`
j=0
2(τ jq)2
N − q +
∑`
j=1
4N
(
e(τ jq)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
=
2q2
N − q
∑`
j=0
τ2j + 4N
(
eq2
N − q
)τ1/2−1∑`
j=1
τ2(τ
1/2−1)j
≤ 4(τ
`q)2
N − q + 8N
(
e(τ `q)2
N − q
)τ1/2−1
.
Here, we use that
∑`
j=0 x
j = x
`+1−1
x−1 ≤ xx−1x` ≤ 2x` for x ≥ 2. uunionsq
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